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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN K. CLUFF and
JESSICA H. CLUFF,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
CASE NO. 145 25

v.
ELMER CULMER and
ESSIE CULMER,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
•

• •

STATEMENT OF THE KIND Of CASE
This action involves a dispute between plaintiff
buyers and defendant sellers over enforcement of a Uniform
Real Estate Contract, executed on March 14, 1973, involving
approximately 13 acres of real property located in Salem, Utah,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.
verdict for $600.00 for the plaintiffs.

The jury rendered a
Plaintiffs submitted

a $43,59.65 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements.

Defendants

replied with a motion for taxation of costs by the court.
The court taxed costs of $85.70 to defendants.
appeal.

Plaintiffs

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the sum taxed by
the court as costs to defendants, and that the sum taxed
as costs be set at that amount submitted in plaintiffs1
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements; or in the alternative
that the case be remanded to District Court for a reconsideration of plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 26, 1974, plaintiffs filed an action
against defendants (R. 135). Plaintiffs alleged that on
March 14, 1973, defendants entered into a real estate contract
in which plaintiffs agreed to buy from defendants approximately 13 acres of property in Salem, Utah (R. 133). Entirely
within the confines of these 13 acres was a small non-navigable lake, stocked with fish (R. 98). Plaintiffs claim it
was agreed defendants would remain as periodic tenants from
month-to-month until April 1, 1974, or until April 1, 1975,
or until Sixty (60) days after notice of termination was
given on or after April 1, 1974 (R. 133). Plaintiff buyers
claim their purchase included the fish in the lake (R. 134) .
Plaintiffs claim defendants, some time after the
purchase, but before defendant sellers surrendered possession,
drained the lake and removed virtually all of the fish (R. 98).
Plaintiff buyers also claim defendant sellers committed
waste by the sellers1 failure to water the lawn and pasture;
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and by the sellers1 failure to properly care for the house
prior to the buyers' gaining possession (R. 134, 135).
Counsel tried the case to jury on January 21, 1976
and January 22, 1976 (R. 55, 57). The jury, in a special
verdict, held the sellers did not remove fish from the pond
(R. 58) and that at the time possession was surrendered by
sellers to the buyers in accordance with the contract of
sale, the reasonable cost of placing the property in the
condition it was in on March 14, 1973, allowing for reasonable wear and tear, would have been $600.00 (R. 59).
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Costs and Necessary-Disbursements pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (R. 51, 52, 53, 54). Plaintiffs1 costs
totalled $4,359.65 (R- 53). On January 30, 1976, defendants
filed a motion for taxation of costs by the court (R. 47,
48).

The court, on February 4, 1976, ruled on defendants'

motion to tax costs to defendants at $83.70.

Plaintiffs

appeal from this ruling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RULING OF THE COURT ON FEBRUARY 4, 1976 SHOULD BE
VACATED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE RULES OF
PRACTICE ADOPTED FOR THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Defendants1 Motion for Taxation of Costs by the
Court was clearly a motion objecting to plaintiffs1 Memorandum
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of Costs and Disbursements,
were involved.

Substantial legal questions

For example:
(1)

Are attorneys1 fees part of costs to be

awarded plaintiffs under the Uniform Real Estate Contract
and its addendum and if so, what sum constitutes a reasonable
attorneys1 fee to be awarded plaintiffs?
(2)

Are costs of witnesses who are subpoenaed

but who do not appear for trial properly included in a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements?
(3)

Are costs of plaintiffs 1 deposition

noticed by defendants properly included in a Memorandum of
Costs and Disbursements and if so, what costs should be
included?
Defendants1 Motion involved legal questions for
the court's consideration.

Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice

adopted in the District Courts of the State of Utah on
September 15, 1975, and which became effective on January
6, 1976, provides:
(b) The responding party shall file and serve
upon all parties within ten (10) days after service
of the motion, a statement of answering points and
authorities and couter affidavits.
(c) The moving party may serve and file reply
points and authorities within five (5) days after
service of responding party T s points and authorities. Upon the expiration of such five (5) day
period to file reply points and authorities,
either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter for decision.
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* *

(e) In all cases where the granting of a motion
would didpose of an action on the merits, with
prejudice, the party resisting the motion may
request oral argument, and such request should be
granted unless the motion is denied. If no such
request is made, oral argument shall be deemed
to have been waived.
The Utah Rules of Practice clearly provide that:
(a)

A responding party shall file a brief

within ten (10) days.
(b)

A provision is made for a reply brief by

movant.
(c) After a reply brief either party may
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision.
It is elementary procedure that the party responding
to a motion is accorded the courtesy of submitting a response
prior to the courtfs entering a ruling.
instant case ruled prematurely.
by plaintiffs.
trary.

The court in the

It ruled prior to any response

Such a ruling is manifestly unfair and arbi-

How is it possible for the court to rule prior to

hearing both sides?
Defendants made a motion on January 30, 197 6
(R. 47, 48). The court ruled on the motion on February 4,
1976 (R. 38). Such a ruling should be Reversed because it
violates the Rules of Practice adopted for the courts of the
State of Utah.
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POINT II
THE COURT'S RULING IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT IS PROPER
TO ALLOW REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1 FEES INASMUCH AS THE
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR SUCH FEES AS PART OF PLAINTIFFS' COSTS
The general rule is that attorneys' fees are not
recoverable by successful litigants either in law or equity
except where they are expressly provided for by contract.
Bitney v. School District No. 44, 533 P.2d 1273 (Mont. 1975).
This general rule has been stated by the Utah Supreme Court
in numerous instances.

See Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders,

Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (1975); Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. Hydroponics, Inc., 535 P.2d 1251 (1975) ;Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Co. v. Hartford Accident § Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325
P.2d 906 (1958); Hawkins v. Perry, 122 Utah 597, 253 P.2d 372
(1953); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195
P. 305 (1921) . The Utah Supreme Court in Blair Enterprises v.
M-D Super Tire Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 192, 499 P.2d 1294 (1972)
which involved an action to have a real estate purchase contract declared unenforceable, said:
The real estate purchase contract provides that
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee.
Id. at 1295,
Other jurisdictions have also affirmed this rule.

See

Seliinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573,
521 P.2d 1119 (1974); Communications Workers of America,
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AFL-CIO, Local 6005 v. Jackson, 516 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1973);
Adamson v. Thrall, 513 P.2d 1157 (Ore. 1973).
As authority for allowing attorneys' fees, plaintiffs cite analogous instances involving contractual disputes
as to real estate transactions in which the contract of sale
made an express provision for reasonable attorneys' fees.
In Pearson v. Sigmund, 503 P.2d 702 (Ore. 1972),
sellers brought suit for an injunction against further cutting and removal of timber under a contract of sale of the
timber.

The seller also demanded payment of $10,000.00

allegedly due under a contract.

After issuance of a prelimi-

nary injunction, the buyer filed a counterclaim for damages,
including attorneys1 fees, for the issuance of a wrongful
injunction and for breach of contract.

The Oregon Supreme

Court held that where the contract for the sale of timber
provided for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a
suit, the trial court had no right to disregard the terms
of the contract and was required to allow reasonable attorneys' fees to the buyers.

The court said:

. . . Because of the contract provision for attorney
fees to the prevailing party, however, the trial
court had no right to disregard the terms of the
contract and was required to allow reasonable
attorney fees to defendants as the prevailing
parties in this case. Gorman, et ux. v. Jones,
et ux., 232 Or. 416, 420, 375 P.2d 821 (1962).
Id. at 706.
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Also see Turner v. Wexler, 14 Wash. App. 143, 538 P.2d 877
(1975) as authority supporting allowance of attorneys1 fees
if the contract provides for reasonable attorneys1 fees if
any action is

Tf

brought to enforce any of the terms of this

agreement or forfeit the same."
In Kammert Bros. Enterprise, Inc. v. Tanque Verde
Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301, 428 P.2d 678 (1967) which involved
an action by the purchaser for damages for the alleged breach
of a real estate agreement, the Supreme Court of Arizona
stated:
Finally the seller claims that an amount of
$7,500 as attorneys* fees should not be allowed
in an action for breach of the contract. Such
fees may be allowed when the contract so provides.
Colvin v. Superior Equipment Company, 96 Ariz.
113, 392 P.2d 778 (1964); Commercial Standard
Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288, 345 P.2d
210 (1959). The contract provided:
"If any suit shall be brought by either
party to enforce or cancel this contract,
the prevailing party to said suit shall
be entitled to recover all costs and
expenses necessarily incurred by him in
connection therewith, including a
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed
by the court."
We believe that the words "to enforce or cancel"
the contract are broad enough to encompass the present
action. This suit can be construed as the buyer?s
means of enforcing its rights under the contract.
Provisions of this type should be given a broad
meaning rather than a narrow and restrictive one,
Leventhal v. Krinsky, 325 Mass. 336, 90 N.E.2d
545, 17 A.L.R.2d 281 (1950). Id. at 685
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The Uniform Real Estate Contract in the instant
case had a clause providing for attorneys1 fees as costs.
Paragraph 21 of the Contract states (R. 128):
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should
they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting
party shall pay all costs and expenses, including
a reasonable attorneyTs fee, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in
obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby,
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or
by the statutes of the State of Utfth whether
this remedy is pursued by filing a suit or
otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 10 of defendants1 pleading in answer
to plaintiffs* Complaint contains a party admission that the
Real Estate Contract of Sale provides fpr an award of costs
"together with a reasonable attorney*s jfee as provided for
in paragraph twenty-one of the contract . . ." (R. 126).
Plaintiffs in the instant case prayed for attorneys* fees in
their original Complaint (R. 135).
To protect the buyers f property rights to take
possession of their property in as good a condition as it
was on March 14, 1973, excepting normal wear and tear it
became necessary for plaintiff buyers to hire counsel and
bring an action at law.
Utah Code Ann. §78-38-2 also prohibits the committing of waste by a tenant in possession of real property.
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Plaintiffs also sought a remedy under this statute by
a lawsuit.
The jury was asked the following question and
answered thus (R. 50):
3. At the time possession of the property
involved in this action was surrendered to the
Cluffs in accordance with the Contract of Sale,
what was or would have been the reasonable cost
of then placing the property in the condition
it was in on or about March 14, 1973, allowing
for reasonable and ordinary wear and tear from
that time to the time of the surrender?
Answer:

$600.00.

The jury thus found defendants, while in lawful
possession of plaintiffs' real property, clearly caused
a diminishment in value beyond the normal wear and tear.
Whether such impairment committed by the Culmers be classified as waste may be relevant to whether the damages should
be trebled under U.C.A. §78-38-2, but it is not relevant to
the question of whether attorneys1 fees in the instant
case are a part of the costs.

It is not relevant because

the buyers, under the contract, have a right to possession
after their property has been diminished only by ordinary wear
and tear.
Under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
the intentions of both parties are clearly and expressly
stated that, if either of the parties defaulted or if it was
necessary to pursue a remedy afforded by the contract (such
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as the right to prohibit the seller from willfully damaging
the property), then the party at fault was to pay nall costs
and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may
arise or accrue from enforcing this agreement or pursuing any
remedy provided by statute of the State of Utah."

The sellers1

destructive acts resulted in an attempt by the buyers to enforce
the agreement.

Plaintiffs' filing of a Complaint was an

attempt to enforce the terms of the real estate contract.
Defendants are contractually obligated to plaintiffs
for reasonable attorneys^

fees as a part of the

costs.

The

court, in its ruling of February 4, 1976, did not have any
right to disregard the terms of the contract, and must allow
reasonable attorneys' fees as a part of costs to plaintiff
buyers.
POINT III
THE COURT'S RULING ON FEBRUARY 4, 1976 IS ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES SUBMITTED IN
IN PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND DISBURSEMENTS IS REASONABLE
There exists no single factor determining whether
attorneys' fees in a given case are reasonable.

Whether

such fees are reasonable is a fact question determinable under
the peculiar circumstances of each case.

Such factors are

aptly summarized in an annotation at 58 A.L.R.3d 201, §2,
entitled "Amount of Attorneys' Compsnation in Matters
Involving Real Estate":
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It is a generally accepted rule that in the
absence of a controlling contract, statute or rule
of court, an attorney is entitled to the reasonable
value of services performed for his client, and that
the reasonableness of the fee is determined by
consideration of a number of factors. The most common
factors are generally considered to be the time and
effort required, the novelty or difficulty of issues,
the skill and standing of counsel, the value of
interest involved, the results secured, ttie loss of
opportunity for other employment, the ability to
pay of the person charged, customary charges for
similar services, and the certainty of payment.
Notwithstanding general agreement by the courts on
the underlying principles, an examination of relevant case law suggests that the various criteria
are accorded varying degrees of significance
depending upon the nature of the services rendered
by the attorney. Id. at 207, 208
Also see Insurance Company of North America v. Omaha Paper Stock,
Inc., 189 Neb. 232, 202 N.W.2d 188 (1972)
. . . The amount involved in this case was $29,000
and attorneys1 fees in the sum of $10,000 were
allowed and taxed to appellant. "The amount
allowed rests in the sound discretion of the district court, considering the elements of the
amount involved, the responsibility assumed, the
questions of law raised, the time and labor
necessarily required in [the] performance of
duties, the professional diligence and skill
required, and the result of the services performed."
Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156
N.W.2d 133. Id. at 191
A common-sense approach followed by numerous courts
on the question of reasonableness of attorneys1 fees is to
base the fee awarded as costs on the hours of work done by
counsel in preparation for trial and actual trial time.

In

Waggoner v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 526 P.2d 578
(Ore. 1974), the lessor-owner of a grocery store brought an
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action for declaratory judgment against the lessee-operator
of the store, seeking to enforce an indemnity provision of
the lease.

The Oregon Supreme Court said the amount of attor-

neys1 fees to be allowed in both an action at law and a suit
in equity is a question of fact.

The Oregon court said:

The award by the trial c ourt of $9,250 in attorney
fees for the trial and app eal of the original case, as
that matter was presented to the trial court for
decision in this case, was based implicitly upon its
determination of the amoun t of time reasonably
required for the trial and appeal of that case and
what would be a reasonable charge per hour for such
a trial and appeal, in the light of the nature and
difficulty of the case, th e amount involved, and
the result obtained, among other things. (Citations
omitted.)
Under these facts and circumstanc es, this court
cannot properly set aside an award of attorney
fees by a trial court which is bas ed upon substantial competent evidence. (Citati ons omitted.)
The trial court was also in a be tter position
than this court to consider the cr edibility of the
testimony offered by defendants and to consider the
amount of time reasonably required for the trial
and appeal of the original case, and a reasonable
charge per hour for such time, as well as other
factors to be considered in the determination and
award of a reasonable attorney fee for both the
trial and appeal of the original case and for the
trial of this case.
It would appear that the award by the trial court
would compensate plaintiffs1 attorneys for the
amount of work devoted by them, according to their
time records, at a rate of between $55 and $40 per
hour. We cannot say that an award of attorney fees
based upon such an hourly charge for the defense
of a personal injury case by an insurance company
or in an action for indemnity between insurance
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companies was excessive. On the contrary we hold
that the award by the trial court was supported
by substantial, competent evidence. Id. at 582
(emphasis added).
The case of Newbern v. Gas-Ice Corporation, 501
P.2d 1294 (Ore. 1972) involved an award of $6,000 attorneys1
fees for 132 hours of work in an action against a corporation
for payments allegedly due under a lease of property.
was claimed in assessing the $6,000 attorneys1 fees.

Error
The

Oregon Supreme Court stated:
Defendant's final contention is that "the trial
court erred in assessing $6,000 attorneys1 fees
against Gas-Ice."
The parties stipulated on trial that the trial
judge might "set attorneys' fees without the necessity of a presentation of evidence." Plaintiff's
attorneys estimated, however, that they devoted 132
hours of work on this case, although they did not
maintain time records to support that estimate.
The award of $6,000 was indeed a liberal allowance
of attorney fees in this case, particularly when
made to attorneys who were unable to support a
request for a larger allowance by records showing
the amount of time devoted by them to his case.
Because of the increasingly high cost of legal
services today, in keeping with the increase in
cost of other goods and services, attorneys are
ordinarily expected to keep time records of their
work for the purpose of billing clients for most
types of legal services as well as for the purpose
of justifying the amount of attorney fees to be
awarded by the courts in cases in which such awards
are proper. Nevertheless, the time devoted by an
attorney is not the only factor to be considered
in determining what is a reasonable attorney
fee. See Code of Professional Responsibility,
DR 2-106 CB) and Annot., 145 A.L.R. 672, 678; 56
A.L.R.2d 15, 20.
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Considering such additional fact|ors as the difficulty and complexity of the issues involved in this
case, the value of the interests involved, the
result secured, the skill and eminence of opposing
counsel and the professional standing of counsel
for plaintiff, as well as the estimate by plaintifffs
counsel of the amount of time devoted by them to
this case, we cannot say that there was not a proper
basis for the allowance by the trial court of $6,000
in attorney fees, particularly in view of the stipulation by the parties. Id. at 129|7.
In Kay v. Biggs, 13 Ariz.App. 172, 475 P.2d 1 (1970)
the court held an award of attorneys' fees of $750 to plaintiff in a quiet title action for attorneysf time of 21.9
hours was reasonable.
In Billinger v. Jost, 510 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1974), a
partition suit, it was held that attorneysf fees and expenses
of $1,945 based upon 52-1/2 hours at $35.00 per hour, plus
$150.00 expenses was reasonable.

In Evans v. Scottsdale

Plumbing Co., 10 Ariz.App. 184, 457 P.2d 724 (1969), a mortgage foreclosure action, the court said|:
Appellants next contend that the award of the
trial court for attorneys' fees wa|s excessive. The
evidence relative to attorneys' fees was presented
at the hearing held on December 15i, 1967. This
Court has examined the transcript of evidence submitted at that hearing and finds that there is
substantial evidence to support thje award and that
the trial court was fully justified in awarding
plaintiff attorneys' fees in the ajmount of $8,500.
Extensive evidence was introduced as to the nature,
amount and value of the legal services rendered.
The number of hours expended exceeded 300, excluding services in connection with tjhe prior default
and appeal in this matter. An award by trial court
for attorneys' fees is tested in tjhe same manner as

-15-

any other judgment, and when there is substantial
evidence to support it, it is our duty to affirm
the award. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 729.
The amount awarded for attornys? fees is not
necessarily unreasonable because the sum exceeds the amount
recovered by plaintiff.

In Humphries v. Puritan Life

Insurance Company, 311 S.2d 534 (La.App. 1975) a suit was
filed to recover under a student accident policy.

The court

entered judgment awarding the insured $550, together with
penalties and attorneysf fees of $1,500.

The court said:

Puritan seeks a decrease, and the plaintiff an
increase, in the $1,500 awarded as plaintiffTs
attorneyfs fee. The amount awarded rests
largely with the discretion of the trial
judge. Niles v. American Bankers Insurance
Company, 220 S.2d 435 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970).
Although the attorney's fee awarded exceeds
the actual award plus penalties, we find no
abuse of discretion. The award is sufficient
to recompense plaintiff's attorney for
services related to this appeal. Id. at
539.
In Taylor v. Jones, 276 S.2d 130 (Ala. 1973),
involving the collection of a note, the Supreme Court of
Alabama held:
. . . a fee greatly exceeded the amount of
principal and interest on the original obligations, the fee is not so excessive as to pronounce error in the allowance accepted by the
trial court."
In Scott v. Travelodge Corporation, 71 Cal.Rptr. 547 (1968)
the lessor brought an action against the lessee to recover
rent due under a lease.
as delinquent rental.

The judgment awarded only $886.55

The court said:
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Appellant's objection to the award of attorneys1 fees is without substantial merit. The
judgment awarded only $886.55 as delinquent
rental; the plaintiffs sued for $12,916.52, and
the trial itself lasted four days. Testimony
showed that the bill of counsel for plaintiffs
to their clients for services rendered to March
21, 1966 was $2,335 and that a further charge of
$300 per day would be made for the time occupied
by the trial. The determination of the recoverable fee was a question of fact within the discretion of the trial court. (6 Cal.Jur.2d Rev.,
Attorneys at Law, §101, pp. 169-172.) The
judgment is affirmed. Id. at 550, 551
The case of Commercial Credit Corporation v. Wallgast,
11 Wash.App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 (1975) involved an action for
a deficiency judgment allowed by the court pursuant to the
terms of a security agreement.

It was objected that the

allowance of $1,225 for attorneys' fees on a recovery of
$1,335.50 was excessive.

The court said:

. . . Whether attorney's fees are reasonable is
a question of fact to be decided in light of the
circumstances of each individual case. The trial
court has broad discretion in making this award.
In re Renton v. Dillingham Corp., 79 Wash.2d 374,
485 P.2d 613 (1971). "Discretion is abused only
where no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the trial court." Jankelson v. Cisel,
3 Wash.App. 139, 142, 473 P.2d 202, 205 (1970).
In allowing $1,225 on a recovery of $1,335.50
the trial judge considered the attorney's time and
the hourly rates prevailing in this area. He
considered as well the fact that defendant put
up a "substantial fight on the small amount."
. . . Id. at 1197.
To some extent at least attorney's fees should be
based upon the amount recovered, but it is only one among many
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factors, and appellants have been unable to discover any cases
holding the fees must have any necessary relationship to the
amount awarded.
In Kuykendall v. Malernee, 516 P.2d 558 (Okl.App.
1973), the court held that $600 awarded as attorneys1 fees
in an action on a consumer loan was inadequate considering
the nature and extent of services rendered by the attorney and
the fact that a contested trial was involved and briefs were
submitted on the issue of damages.
The reasonable value of services performed by the
attorney in a given case is a question of fact

determined in

the light of the particular circumstances of the case.
v.

Colbath, 516 P.2d 763 (Ore.App. 1973).

Colbath

The test is whether

the amount awarded is fairly supported by evidence of services
rendered.

Realty West, Inc. v. Thomas, 95 Id. 262, 506 P.2d

830 (1973).

The Utah Supreme Court in Blair Enterprises,

supra, stated:
. . . This court has held unless the parties agree
otherwise, the court is obliged to take evidence
on the issue of the reasonableness of the attorney's
fee and to make findings thereon. Provo City Corp.
v. Cropper, 27 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 . . . Id. at
1295.
Plaintiffs, in the instant case, are seeking attorneys1
fees of approximately $4,000.00 based upon time records supporting approximately 80 hours of legal work.
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In Newbern,

supra, $6,000.00 attorneys1 fees were allowed as reasonable for
132 hours of legal work.

In Kay, supra, $750.00 attorneys1

fees were allowed for 21.9 hours of legal work.

In Evans,

supra, $8,500.00 attorneys' fees were allowed for 300 hours of
legal work.

In Billinger, supra, $1,945.00 attorneys' fees

were allowed for 52-1/2 hours of legal work.

Four thousand

dollars sought by plaintiff in the instant case is reasonable
when compared with the above cases.
POINT III
THERE EXISTS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT
TO SUPPORT A SUM OF $4,091.25 ALLOWED AS ATTORNEYS' FEES
A party such as the plaintiffs in the instant case
has the burden of making a prima facie Showing of the reasonableness of the fee under the circumstances

of the case.

Quarngesser v. Quarngesser, 177 S.2d 875 (Fla. 1965).

Plain-

tiffs have easily met this minimal burden by submitting a
verified, detailed itemization in their cost bill of the
dates and amounts of time expended.

This detailed itemization

has been extracted directly from the record in counsel's
office of legal charges incurred by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs

have cited numerous cases as authority for the reasonableness
of the amount of $4,091.25 as attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs

have therefore made a substantial showing of the reasonableness of the fee under the circumstances of the case.
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In fixing a reasonable amount of attorneys1 fees,
the judge is more or less an expert in his own right.
v. Suggs, 147 S.2d 263 (La. 1962).

Wegmann

The taking of proof is not

essential to the allowance of attorneysf fees when allowed by
the trial judge since ordinarily he would not need the opinion
of an attorney as to what would be reasonable attorneys1 fees
since he is an attorney himself.

The trial court has authority

to fix reasonable attorneys1 fees in the absence of expert
testimony and to establish

the value of services where the

services are rendered under the eye of the court.

Caldwell v.

Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corporation, 311 S.2d 80 (La.App. 1975).
The Utah Supreme Court in F.M.A. Financial Corporation
v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) held that an
award of attorneys' fees must be based upon evidence.

The

evidence in the instant case is the verification by the
attorney of record of the correctness and necessity of the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements (R. 54). Such an affidavit
was not controverted by defendant.

This affidavit is sufficient

along with the numerous cases cited by plaintiffs to establish
the reasonableness of $4,091.21, the sum plaintiffs seek as
attorneys1 fees.
CONCLUSION
The ruling on February 4, 1976 to tax costs to
defendants at $85.70 violated the Rules of Practice because
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the court had ruled before plaintiffs had responded.

The

ruling thus violated an elementary canon of practice, inasmuch as a ruling can obviously only occur after the court has
listened to both positions.

The ruling was procedurally defective

The ruling was also substantively defective because
the uniform real estate contract between the parties provided
for reasonable attorneys1 fees accruing from enforcing the
agreement.

Buyers, by filing a suit and prevailing, were

attempting to enforce their contractual right to possess the
property from the sellers, undiminished in value except for
normal use.

The amount of attorneys1 fees submitted in plain-

tiffs1 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements was reasonable.
The sum was reasonable when judged by other cases.

The veri-

fication by the attorney of record required by Rule 55(d)(2),
U.R.C.P., as to the correctness and necessity of the Memorandum
of Costs and Disbursements, is sufficient evidence.

This is

especially true when plaintiffs' affidavit, as in the instant
case, was uncontroverted by defendants.
The court's ruling on February 4, 1976 is erroneous.
Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements should be
allowed, or should be remanded for a reconsideration of costs.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH § PJ.UMB

By

c

Orrin G. Hatch
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